Posted on March 22, 2010 - by David
Not Sick: The 1973 Removal of Homosexuality from the DSM
81 Words, a 2002 episode of NPR’s This American Life that was recently rebroadcast, tells the story behind the removal of the homosexuality diagnosis from the DSM-II in 1973. You can download the audio or read a transcript of the show here: part 1, part 2.
The report is given by Alix Spiegel, whose grandfather, Dr. John P. Spiegel, was president-elect of the American Psychiatric Association in 1973 when this historic change took place. Alix describes the family myth – that grandpa had single-handedly changed the APA’s position on homosexuality and removed one of the major barriers to equal rights for homosexuals in America. The truth, she says, is actually much more complicated. Though he did play a role in this historic change, ‘grandpa’ was not the driving force his family believed him to be, nor were his motives simply those of dedicated psychiatrist and champion of human rights. In Alix Spiegel’s words:
… this version of events was discarded anyway. Discarded after the family went on vacation to the Bahamas to celebrate my grandfather’s 70th birthday. I remember it well. I also remember my grandfather stepping out from his beach front bungalow on that first day followed by a small well-built man, a man that later during dinner my grandfather introduced to a shocked family as his lover, David. David was the first of a long line of very young men that my grandfather took up with after my grandmother’s death. It turned out that my grandfather had had gay lovers throughout his life, had even told his wife-to-be that he was homosexual, two weeks before their wedding. And so in 1981 the story that my family told about the definition in the DSM changed dramatically.
According to Alix Spiegel, from the 40’s through the early 60’s, the APA was a very conservative organization, largely uninterested in “weighing in on the issues of the day.” In her interviews with psychiatrists who were members of the APA in 1970, when the forces behind the definition change began to take shape, she was told that the overwhelming majority of the APA believed that homosexuality was indeed a mental illness – “even the ones of us who were gay,” added Dr. John Fryer.
Fryer was not alone in the APA. Because homosexuals were not allowed to practice psychiatry, Fryer and others like him had to hide their sexual preference, but they began to meet informally at APA conventions, calling themselves the Gay PA. There may have been a sense of solidarity among them, but they were not questioning the official psychiatric stance on homosexuality. Fryer told Spiegel, “because of our own internalized homophobia, most of us probably agreed that it was OK to be a disease.”
The idea that homosexuality was a form of insanity rather than a ‘moral abomination’ was first put forth in the 19th century, and Spiegel notes that many homosexuals actually saw this as a step forward. In the early 70’s, psychoanalysis, Freud’s great gift to psychiatry, was still the dominant form of therapy and mode of theoretical understanding in the profession. The two psychoanalytic authorities on homosexuality were Dr. Irving Bieber and Dr. Charles Socarides. Bieber, who was later demonized by gay activists, actually became interested in the subject of homosexuality after working as an army psychiatrist during WWII, when soldiers who were found to be homosexual were dishonorably discharged. Bieber believed they should receive treatment instead of being discharged, and because of this position, he was never promoted from his rank of Captain during his four years of service. Returning home, he began to research and write about this topic, which culminated in the 1962 publication of Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study. As Spiegel says, this book, which analyzes the work of 77 doctors and over 100 of their gay patients, “concluded that the cause of homosexuality was a combination of what they termed close-binding mothers – which is overprotective women who made their children weak and feminine – and detached, rejecting fathers.”
Of course, there was other data used to argue against the idea of homosexuality as a mental illness. Alfred Kinsey’s famous and highly controversial report on male sexuality, published in 1948, found that 37% of American men had had physical contact to the point of orgasm with another man. Some opponents of the diagnosis used Kinsey’s work to claim that an experience so common could not be reasonably considered pathological.
The work of Evelyn Hooker, a psychologist from UCLA, was first made public in 1956, and addressed one of the main criticisms leveled against psychiatrists like Dr. Irving Bieber, whose study subjects consisted only of homosexuals who were imprisoned, in mental hospitals, had been discharged from the military, or had otherwise sought treatment on their own. Hooker’s aim was to examine gay men who weren’t troubled by their own sexuality. She administered psychological tests to 30 homosexuals who had never sought therapy, as well as 30 heterosexuals who were matched for comparable age, IQ, and education. The disguised results were then given to three experienced psychiatrists who were asked to identify the homosexuals. They were unable to distinguish between the two groups, and categorized two-thirds of both groups as “perfectly well-adjusted, normally functioning human beings.”
In 1970, the APA held their convention in San Francisco, probably an ill-advised choice of location. Gay rights activists showed up, some of whom had apparently obtained press passes from people within the APA, and made their feelings known. Bieber was a particular target, and they effectively broke up the meeting where he was trying to give a talk. The ’71 convention was much the same story.
While there was obvious pressure coming from the gay community to change the DSM, there was also something happening inside the APA. It seems from Spiegel’s story that the psychiatrists of the Gay PA were for the most part content to gather in secret and accept the traditional designation of homosexuals as sick, but others had begun to mobilize. In Dr. John P. Spiegel’s Cambrige, MA home, a small group of psychiatrists, ‘the young turks,’ began to meet:
The young turks were all psychiatrists, all members of the APA and all liberal-minded easterners who had decided to reform the American Psychiatric Association from the inside. Specifically they had decided to replace all the grey-haired conservatives who ran the organization with a new breed of psychiatrist; more sensitive to the social issues of the day with liberal opinions on Kent State, Vietnam, feminism. They figured that once they got this new breed into office they could fundamentally transform American psychiatry. And one of the things this group was keen to transform was American psychiatry’s approach to homosexuality.
Spiegel is quick to clarify that this group and others like it by no means constituted a “homosexual cabal,” but “several of the key players were gay,” and the young turks were able to use their influential positions as members of the Committee for Concerned Psychiatry to propose candidates for office. Despite all the visible and colorful protests of the APA by gay activists, Spiegel maintains that if it weren’t for the internal changes set into motion by these psychiatrists, the DSM diagnosis would have gone untouched.
At the 1972 convention, the efforts of those working for change both inside and outside the APA were joined for the first time. Gay psychiatrist Dr. John Fryer, recently ousted from his job at UPenn and apparently unemployable due to the rumors of his homosexuality, was recruited by activists to give a speech about the damaging effects of the DSM diagnosis. Though he initially refused the offer, after being rejected by one university after another as he looked for a new job, Fryer accepted the second request on the condition that his identity remain a secret. He appeared as ‘Dr. Anonymous,’ wearing a loud suit several sizes too big, his face hidden behind a distorted Nixon mask, hair covered by a wig, speaking into a special microphone to alter his voice. “He explained to his fellow psychiatrists how these [81] words had harmed him, and others like him,” and when he was through, received a standing ovation.
Independent of the changes already underway on the inside, there was another chance encounter involving an APA psychiatrist and a gay activist which proved to be instrumental in this process. During a behavioral therapy conference in New York City in ‘72, Dr. Robert Spitzer, a member of the APA’s committee on nomenclature and subscriber to the standard psychiatric view of homosexuality, was sitting in a meeting when Ron Gold stood up and spoke out against psychiatry’s oppression of gays. Spitzer made a point of speaking to Gold after the meeting ; he wanted to express his annoyance at the inappropriateness of the interruption. But when Gold discovered that Spitzer was on the nomenclature committee – the group that first decides what should and shouldn’t end up in the DSM – the conversation went in a different direction. The two men parted ways with Spitzer agreeing to set up a meeting for Gold with the committee as well as a panel discussion at the next convention where gay activists could participate.
At the 1973 APA convention in Honolulu, a few months after the requested audience with the nomenclature committee left the psychiatrists at a loss as to what should be done about the diagnosis, “The old guard, Charles Socarides and Irving Bieber, publicly met the new school, Ronald Gold, Judd Marmor [a future president of the APA] and several other psychiatrists in front of a room filled to capacity.” The showdown was a resounding victory for the gay activists. Even Socarides admits that the reception to his speech, (which Gold referred to as “his ‘they’re betraying their mammalian heritage’ number”), hardly qualified as warm. “A lot of people booed,” he told Spiegel, “some people clapped.”
Perhaps the most surprising part of this story, the last shove leading to the change, came later that night in a Honolulu bar. Gold, as the hero of the day, was invited to a covert Gay-PA celebration, and decided to bring Spitzer, who still didn’t personally know of any gay psychiatrists, along with him. Spitzer was supposed to be playing the role of a closeted gay man, but when he realized some of the big names who had been part of this underground group for years, he was shocked, and started asking questions that gave his true identity away. A psychiatrist Gold described as “the grand dragon of the Gay PA” wanted Spitzer out of there, but Gold refused on the grounds that Spitzer was actually doing something to help homosexuals, while the Gay PA had done nothing. In the middle of this encounter, a man in full army uniform walked into the bar, looked around, and fell weeping into Gold’s arms. As Gold tells Spiegel:
Well I had no idea who he was. It turned out he was a psychiatrist, an army psychiatrist based in Hawaii who was so moved by my speech, he told me, that he decided he had to go to a gay bar for the first time in his life. And somehow or other he got directed to this particular bar and saw me and all the gay psychiatrists and it was too much for him, he just cracked up. And it was a very moving event, I mean this man was awash in tears. And I believe that that was what decided Spitzer, right then and there, let’s go. Because it was right after that that he said, ‘Let’s go write the resolution.’ And so we went back to Spitzer’s hotel room and wrote the resolution.
While obviously we don’t have the original text composed by Gold and Spitzer in Honolulu– perhaps scrawled on some long lost sheets of hotel stationary –I’m guessing that much of what was written that night ended up here, in this position statement proposing a change in diagnosis from homosexuality to ‘Sexual Orientation Disturbance’ with homosexuality bracketed. This change was to be put into effect for the 6th printing of the DSM II and read as follows:
302.0 Sexual orientation disturbance (Homosexuality)
This category is for individuals whose sexual interests are directed primarily toward people of the same sex and who are either disturbed by, in conflict with, or wish to change their sexual orientation. This diagnostic category is distinguished from homosexuality, which by itself does not constitute a psychiatric disorder. Homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and, like other forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric disorders, is not listed in this nomenclature of mental disorders.
In this paper, Spitzer basically states that homosexuality is a normal variant of human sexuality. He writes that “for a mental or psychiatric condition to be considered a psychiatric disorder, it must either regularly cause subjective distress, or regularly be associated with some generalized impairment in social effectiveness or functioning,” and because many homosexuals do not meet these criteria, homosexuality should not be considered an illness. Spitzer clearly understood that this change was in part a political action, stating that “we will be removing one of the justifications for the denial of civil rights to individuals whose only crime is that their sexual orientation is to members of the same sex.” However, he writes that the removal of the homosexuality diagnosis does not amount to “saying that it is ‘normal’ or as valuable as heterosexuality,” and maintains that “this change should in no way interfere with or embarrass those dedicated psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who have devoted themselves to understanding and treating those homosexuals who have been unhappy with their lot.” The idea, in the end, was that if someone was bothered by their own homosexual thoughts, impulses, or behavior, the DSM still had them covered.
This initial change, officially announced by Dr. Alfred Friedman, president of the APA, on December 15, 1973, may have allowed psychoanalysts to continue treating gay patients for a time, but in less than 15 years, the DSM would be wiped clean of the last traces of the idea that homosexuality could be a mental illness. Spitzer’s original change had been rewritten as ‘ego-dystonic homosexuality’ for the DSM-III, but was removed altogether in 1987.
Dr. Charles Socarides, the most prominent player on the losing team, responded to the change in a 1978 article titled ‘The Sexual Deviations and the Diagnostic Manual,’ published in the American Journal of Psychotherapy. In protest of further proposed revisions for the soon to be published DSM-III, Socarides wrote, “these changes would remove from psychoanalysis and psychiatry entire areas of scientific progress, rendering chaotic fundamental truths about unconscious psychodynamics, as well as the interrelationship between anatomy and psychosexual identity.” In particular, Socarides objected to the fact that the heading ‘Sexual Deviations,’ under which the homosexuality diagnosis had once was fallen, was going to be entirely removed from the DSM-III. Proponents of this change pointed to reports like Kinsey’s, arguing that a phenomenon as common as homosexuality shouldn’t be understood as a deviation, but Socarides believed this was faulty reasoning:
To form conclusions as to the specific meaning of an event simply because of its frequency of occurrence is to the psychoanalyst scientific folly. Only in the consultation room, using the techniques of introspective reporting and free association, protected by the laws of medicine and professional ethics, will an individual, pressed by his suffering and pain, reveal the hidden (even from himself) meaning and reasons behind his acts.
When I read Socarides’ paper, I noticed that he repeatedly summons the name of science, even while his argument belies a dogmatic faith in psychoanalysis –an approach that has been waning in popularity for decades, suffering from the criticism that it lacks scientific validity. Regardless of who is right or wrong in this argument, (or any similar argument for that matter), what I find most interesting is how it is imperative for each party to claim the support of science. One of the last people Spiegel speaks to in her report is Ronald Bayer, a public health historian from Columbia who wrote a history of this change titled Homosexuality and American Psychiatry. Bayer tells Spiegel that “the nature of these controversies,” is that “both sides wrap themselves in the mantle of science and both sides charge that the other side is being unscientific.”
While developments in medicine and advances in genetic study and different brain imaging technologies have no doubt increased the importance of being aligned with “science” when it comes to psychiatric debate, this is not a new phenomenon, nor was it new in the ‘70’s. At the same time, stories like this one makes it plain that the progress of certain disciplines may be driven just as much by personal and political factors as it is by actual scientific progress. I wonder if the removal of the homosexuality diagnosis in 1973 wasn’t the beginning of the end for psychoanalysis, as well as the first move towards the more standardized, symptom-based diagnoses of the 1980 DSM-III. This seems reasonable, considering that Robert Spitzer was chairman of the task force responsible for creating the new edition and directed the development of the revised edition published in 1987 (DSM-III-R).
As the APA prepares for the publication of the DSM-V in 2013, I believe it’s worthwhile to keep this story in mind. Some of the proposed changes seem to have more to do with a desire to remove a stigmatizing label than real “scientific” evidence. And like homosexuality, the pathology of which was for a many years assumed but never proven, the scientific understanding of some of the older DSM diagnoses is not particularly strong. Studying the history of psychiatry can’t necessarily prove or disprove the validity of a diagnosis, but it may help us to remain cautious as we go forward.
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March 24, 2010
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nic demauro said:
Very interesting article. I was not aware of the work by Hooker, and found that particullarly intriguing. Stereo- typical behaviour aside, it really shows that there is no sound method/ reasoning for discerning the sexual preference difference.
I too wonder how the changes being proposed for the upcoming revison will be percieved in 20 or 30 years time. Will our advances by that time make us seem as archaic as that does to us now???
Finally, nevermind the 81 words, I have 10 words of my own, (being a gay guy I can say this) “I used to be crazy… but I’m not crazy anymore”.
I enjoy the posts, keep them coming. All the best to you.
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March 27, 2010
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Arturo said:
Interesting post as always, and I really liked that episode of “This American Life” as well. I had never really heard the social movement “story” of the de-medicalization of homosexuality and so it was nice to hear the narrative of how and why this “disease” was created in the first place and its eventual demise given socio-democratic changes. It’s interesting for example that there were psychiatrists in the 1940s who in their time believed they were truly helping individuals who were otherwise being victimized in institutions like the army, but even this more benign approach toward stigmatized group had eventual shortcomings and was problematic. The fact that they were psychiatrists who were genuinely shocked by the gay activists who protested the APA hearings in the 1970s speaks to the contradictory dynamics of calling something a disease or a pathology so as to assuage stigma.
The same story is somewhat playing out with the current DSM classification of Gender Identity Disorder (GID), what I imagine is a vestige of the previous classification of sickness for homosexuality. Marginal groups within mental health who still see homosexuality as pathological have supported the continued inclusion of this category in the next DSM (see http://www.narth.com), but so has some transgender activist groups though for very different reasons. While the former are interested in treating GID in youth so as to prevent what they see as the pathological outcomes of a deviant lifestyle (including in this the risks associated with becoming gay adults), some in the transgender community agree with the medical diagnosis because it allows for medical insurance to cover the costs of sex reassignment surgery. The two groups of course see the treatment of GID very differently, but both see value in the continued limited medicalization of homosexuality, it seems. While I think the mental health field has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, as suggested by the narrative from the “This American Life” episode, I feel these issues are still unresolved. What a medical diagnosis means and how it’s used and misused are still ongoing questions.
I think you’re right though, that parties in these debates always seem to cultivate the language of science to make their case. Take a look at the NARTH page for instance, they sometimes cite really reputable journals and institutions. I think questions of medicalization of homosexuality, and what this will actually mean, will continue for some time especially given the increased interesting in deciphering the “gay genes.” The science into these issues are improving at a dramatic rate, but one wonders if it will be less about the science than social movements that will determine the significance of these debates.
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March 28, 2010
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David said:
Arturo,
I was also thinking of this debate over GID. I hesitate to even comment on it, but I stumbled on this paper by Dr. Nick Gorton (a transgendered person) arguing that GID should remain in the DSM. I think its illustrative of some of the logical difficulties in this debate.
Some argue that transgenderism should be considered a medical rather than a psychiatric illness because it has a physical/biological etiology. Gorton’s response is basically, “yes, but so do all psychiatric illnesses.” This is based on the accepted authority of the establishment. “The etiology of mental illness in the physical has been accepted for decades by the medical and mental health communities.” This position is clearly materialist, and one is left to wonder why this argument doesn’t lead to a call for the abolishment of psychiatry in general and the absorption of all the mistakenly named “mental illnesses” into general medical practice.
Gorton writes:
“While environment certainly effects the expression of mental illness, this is also a biological effect in itself (just as environment in the form of diet and sedentary lifestyle produce biological changes which result in diabetes in vulnerable individuals.)”
Of course this misses the fact that “diet and sedentary lifestyle” are not merely material but also cultural phenomena. While no one is denying that genes play a role in the development of diabetes, it seems obvious that what or how much people eat and their level of activity are not determined merely by biology or the physical environment. If people eat more sugary foods and get less exercise today than they did 100 years ago, it is above all a result of cultural changes.
Gorton then rejects the argument of some transgendered people, that the mind is fine but the body is the problem:
“The research that has been done on the etiology of transgenderism (and gender identity and behavior in general) points to significant differences in the brains of typical males and females. In those instances where there is an alteration from this norm, organisms may have behaviors and feelings that are typical of the opposite gender. For example, sometimes otherwise female animals may demonstrate male typical behaviors due to changes in the brain that occur along typical male-gendered lines. In these types of instances, the cause of the pathology is not that a female body develops where a male body should have, but that a male mind develops incorrectly in an otherwise normal female body. Thus in transgender people who have otherwise normal bodies, normal chromosomal number, and otherwise normal physical development, the pathogenesis of the condition should be seen in the one element that ‘does not fit’, that is, the oppositely gendered-mind. ”
Of course the word “mind” is used here with no definition. It is either a synonym for brain (in which case “oppositely gendered-brain” would not make sense, since the physical organ of the brain plays an important role in regulating the apparently normal function of the rest of the body), or it implies the subjective experience of the transgendered person whose feelings (which, remember, are supposedly generated by brain dysfunction) conflict with his/her body. So, we run once again into that problematic dualist mind/body split. If the etiology is physical, as Dr. Gorton claims, then how is it that the problem becomes manifest in this apparently separate reality of the mind?
Dr. Gorton’s rejection of the “curability” argument only further complicates things. Some who advocate removal of GID from the DSM claim that “even if transgender people have a psychopathology before transition they cease to have that pathology after transition. Thus transgender people who have completed transition no longer have any illness whatsoever.”
The following is presented to counter this claim:
“… for any transgender person, the possibility remains that he will be discovered as transgender and thus not allowed the full rights and responsibilities of his gender. When placed in such a situation, despite completion of hormonal and surgical therapy, a recrudescence of symptoms is reasonably likely due to the same conflict between self-identity and societal treatments and perceptions.”
So initially, the illness is described as a conflict (caused by atypical brain function) between the transgendered person’s feelings and his/her body, but now, the symptoms are described as resulting from a “conflict between self-identity and societal treatments and perceptions” (in other words, symptoms independent of brain function). This is like saying that negative emotions experienced as a result of discrimination are equivalent to mental illness. It’s as if Gorton is trying to balance the biological argument with the idea that mental illness is a social construct. Gorton’s rejection implies that if there was some way of guaranteeing the transgendered person “the full rights and responsibilities of his gender,” then that person would indeed be cured. In other words, after transition, the problem is not with the body or the mind, but with society.
In the end of Gorton’s paper, psychiatry’s function proves to be primarily political. Keeping the GID in the DSM is the best way to ensure that transgendered people will receive the care that they need. The only proposed change is moving GID from the chapter on ‘Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders’ to the section on ‘Disorders Usually First Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence,” in order to better distinguish gender identity from sexual orientation and because “While previously uncommon, GID is increasingly recognized in childhood. Moreover, the vast majority of transgender people and their families report manifestation of their GID in early childhood.”
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March 29, 2010
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Arturo said:
Hi David,
Thanks for passing on the Gorton paper; it’s a very interesting read (though I think there is a one too many “https” in your initial link above). I agree with you that Gorton seems to be vying for a balance between a purely materialist—biomedical—view of the “disorder” with a perspective cognizant of the societal consequences and influences of the condition, though as you point out, he seems to conflate notions of culture as something that simply follows a biological imperative. Interestingly, while I think he does a nice job illustrating the logical fallacies underpinning some of the calls to depathologize GID, in the end he appears to be arguing for a much more pragmatic solution to these issues rather than a philosophical position on the meaning of GID. In the end he seems to offer a type of cost-benefit analysis to labeling vs. not labeling the condition, which I think is a valid way of deciphering these issues.
I also found very interesting, though, your critique of his specific position for the continued diagnostic status of GIS given the enduring social costs of being a transgender person even after re-assignment surgery. Gorton seems to argue that even after a successful transition these individuals are still at risk for emotional turmoil given their potential societal rejection and stigma, and thus, should still be seen within the purview of the GID category so that they can continue to seek treatment. As you point out, however, this logic seems to contradict his pervious materialist assertion of mental illness as something that primarily originates in the brain (or in the case of GID the gendered-brain). As you say, if societal influences have this influence in his framework, isn’t this like equating the negative emotions of discrimination, such as distress and unhappiness, with mental illness? This is a good point and was particularly salient for me, because I often find myself thinking about this very issue.
In psychology, sociology and public health literatures, studies that examine the health-consequences related to discrimination and racism have become very hot topics of late. Though this is still a very nascent field, there is in fact a growing body of studies pointing to this or that negative health outcome related to increased exposure to discrimination. The issue of mental health, however, has always irked me when framed in this context for reasons similar to your point. While some studies are careful to point out that they are measuring depressive symptoms, or well being, and not a clinical diagnosis itself, other studies seem to explicitly equate discrimination as a specific risk factor for mental illness. Consequently I sometimes feel some sociologists are unintentionally medicalizing the responses to the very societal conditions they are trying to highlight, as though by doing so they are somehow making issues of racism and discrimination more real or pressing because they have linked them to medical conditions. Though this is what a sociologist should be doing to a large degree (highlighting the societal underpinnings of health) there seems to be a risk of pathologizing the responses to these conditions rather than the conditions themselves.
I can find some of these studies very useful and interesting at times, in particular findings that seem to illuminate a complex picture of how these dynamics play out (for instance studies that show how higher SES individuals of color may experience less daily exposure to acts of racism and discrimination, but may nonetheless be more “vulnerable” to them when they occur, than individuals of lower SES). Other times, however, I feel researchers (especially sociologists) are less clear, or less careful about what their research is implying. I don’t know if I am making sense here, but there seems to be a tension between calling attention to societal conditions and inequalities, and labeling the responses of these conditions as pathological.
I think medical anthropologists do a better job deciphering this in terms of social suffering vs. mental health conditions and how these two responses overlap at times but are nonetheless distinct. A medical anthropologist that has helped me to think about these issues has been Arthur Kleinman (though also Alan Horwitiz’s work as we have discussed before). Kleinman recently gave a nice talk about the future direction of culturally-informed mental health research that tackled this issue directly that I think you would find interesting. Here is a link to a recent APA meeting and if you scroll down you can find his plenary talk (you can skip the first 5 mins about the history of medical anthropology but I would check it out when you have time)
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/smaconference/video/index.html